The Epistemology of Modality by Mallozzi, Antonella et al.
pdf version of the entry
The Epistemology of Modality
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/modality-epistemology/
from the Fall 2021 Edition of the
Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman
Principal Editor Senior Editor
Colin Allen Hannah Kim Paul Oppenheimer
Associate Editor Associate Editor Associate Editor
Faculty Sponsors: R. Lanier Anderson & Thomas Icard
Editorial Board: https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html
Library of Congress ISSN: 1095-5054
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem-
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries,
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ .
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Copyright c© 2021 by the publisher
The Metaphysics Research Lab
Department of Philosophy
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
The Epistemology of Modality
Copyright c© 2021 by the authors
Antonella Mallozzi, Anand Vaidya, and Michael Wallner
All rights reserved.
Copyright policy: https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/
The Epistemology of Modality
First published Wed Dec 5, 2007; substantive revision Fri Jun 25, 2021
Actual facts are facts about how things are. For example, Mary actually
wore her white dress to the party. Modal facts, by contrast, are facts about
how things could, must, or could not have been. For example, Mary could
have worn her red dress; but she couldn’t have worn a dress that is red and
green all over at the same time. Modal reasoning is central to human
cognition, since it is pervasive both in philosophy and in every-day
contexts. It involves investigating and evaluating claims about what is
possible, impossible, essential, necessary, and contingent. Some things
could have been different than they actually are, other things could not
have been. And some things could have more easily been true than other
things. Here are some examples of different kinds of modal claims:
1. Although Antonella, Michael, and Anand are philosophers, they
could have been musicians in a band called Supervenience.
2. While Hillary Clinton lost the 2016 election, she could have won.
3. It is impossible for Franco to have parents other than Mario and
Emilia, since Franco’s parents are essential to him.
4. Necessarily, if it is raining, then it is raining.
5. It is impossible for something to fall under both the concept of a
bachelor and the concept of a married male at the same time.
6. Mark must be in the room, since I hear him in there.
7. It is not possible for material objects to move faster than the speed of
light.
8. One cannot travel from Rome to New York in less than 3 hours.
9. Lisa can fit both a beach umbrella and a beach chair into the trunk of
her car.
10. Italy could more easily have been in the 2018 World Cup Final than
America.
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Sentences (1)–(10) instantiate different kinds of modality. (1–3) are most
naturally interpreted to be about metaphysical modality; (4) about logical
modality, (5) about conceptual modality, (6) about epistemic modality, (7)
about physical modality, (8) about technological modality, and (9–10)
about practical modality.
Further examples of modal claims are found at crucial places in
philosophical arguments, either in the set of premises or as the conclusion.
(St. Anselm) It is necessary that God exists.
(Descartes) It is possible for the mind to exist without the body.
(Berkeley) It is impossible for anything to exist unperceived.
The epistemology of modality investigates how we can know statements
like (1)–(10), as well as modal premises or conclusions in philosophical
arguments, such as we find in St. Anselm, Descartes, and Berkeley.
Traditionally, the central focus of the discipline has been on knowledge of
metaphysical modality. More precisely, the epistemology of modality
seeks to provide answers to the following question.
General question: How can we come to know, or be justified in
believing, what is necessary, possible, contingent, essential, and
accidental?
Recently, Vaidya and Wallner (2021) have further refined the General
question by splitting it into two different questions:
Access question: How can we epistemically access the modal realm?
Navigation question: How should we navigate from one kind of
modality to another?
The Access question investigates how we initially gain epistemic access to
modal propositions, such as those in (1)–(10) or in philosophical
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arguments.
The Navigation question presupposes that we have some modal
knowledge, and then investigates how we can move from one kind of
modality to another, such as, e.g., from conceptual to metaphysical
modality. In other words, it asks how we come to know that some
proposition  is, say, metaphysically necessary, given that we already
know that  is, say, conceptually necessary. While the Navigation question
focuses on how we can have a certain kind of modal knowledge given that
we already have another kind of modal knowledge, the Access question
targets the issue of how we can have modal knowledge in the first place.
This entry surveys the current state of the field by paying particular
attention to how theories of modal knowledge have addressed the Access
question and the Navigation question. (For other surveys: Gendler &
Hawthorne 2002; McLeod 2005; Evnine 2008; Strohminger and Yli-
Vakkuri 2017; Mallozzi 2021c.) For each theory we discuss, we propose a
number of critical questions. These questions serve a dual purpose. They
recapitulate the central points for the theories and raise concerns about
them.
1. Varieties of Modality and the Target of the Epistemology of
Modality
2. Classification Schemes in the Epistemology of Modality
2.1 Mental Capacities and Inferential Methods
2.2 Necessity-First vs. Possibility-First
2.3 Modal Rationalism vs. Modal Empiricism
3. Skepticism and Knowability
4. Conceivability, Imagination, Intuition, and Understanding
4.1. Conceivability
4.2. Counterfactual Imagination
4.3 Intuition and Understanding
p
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5. Varieties of Essentialism
6. Perception
7. Induction and Abduction





1. Varieties of Modality and the Target of the
Epistemology of Modality
The broad focus of the epistemology of modality is the so-called “alethic”
or “objective” modalities. These are usually identified with those
modalities that respect the T axiom of modal logic,  (if a
proposition is necessary, then it is true, where the box stands for
necessity). Non-alethic modalities, such as deontic modality (which has to
do with obligations and permissions, namely what is obligatory for one to
do and what one is permitted to do, according to, e.g., the moral norms, or
the law), do not obey the T axiom, since, e.g., even if one is obligated to
do , they might not do . Although epistemic modalities do respect the T
axiom (if one knows that , then  is true) they are usually ruled out “by
hand”, so to speak, qua non-alethic and non-objective, since they are
thought to be dependent on the epistemic subject.
Among the alethic (or objective) modalities we find logical, physical, and
metaphysical modality. Where  is a proposition, logical and physical
modality are standardly defined as follows:
 is logically possible iff  is consistent with the laws of logic.
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 is physically possible iff  is consistent with the laws of nature.
 is physically necessary iff  follows from the laws of nature.
It is more controversial how one should define metaphysical modality. The
traditional approach appeals to alternative ways the world might have
been, called “possible worlds”.
 is metaphysically possible iff  is true in at least one possible
world.
 is metaphysically necessary iff  is true in all possible worlds.
Alternatively, philosophers have defined metaphysical modality in terms
of laws of metaphysics (see, e.g., Kment 2014, 2021; for discussion:
Wilsch 2015, 2020).
 is metaphysically possible iff  is consistent with the laws of
metaphysics.
 is metaphysically necessary iff  follows from the laws of
metaphysics.
In addition, metaphysical modality has often been characterized as the
widest, strongest, most unrestricted, or absolute modality (e.g., Kripke
1980; Lewis 1986; Stalnaker 2003; van Inwagen 1998; Hale 2013;
Williamson 2016). While these are metaphorical labels (and recently the
target of several criticisms, e.g., Clarke-Doane 2019a, 2019b; Mallozzi
forthcoming a), the core idea is that metaphysical modality is not restricted
by the laws of nature and is more substantive than logical-conceptual
modality. As such, it is plausibly the modality of philosophical thinking
par excellence.
A helpful diagram to understand the relationship between the three main
alethic modalities, namely logical, physical, and metaphysical modality, is
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modalities, such that what is physically possible is also metaphysically





FIG. 1: Nesting model for possibility.
Conversely, what is logically necessary is metaphysically necessary, and
what is metaphysically necessary is also physically necessary. Other kinds
of modality can be suitably added to the model, as well, such as practical
possibility. Practical possibilities would be within the physical
possibilities. Importantly, some philosophers question whether
metaphysical modality is a distinct and irreducible modality. Alternative
accounts include inflationism, deflationism, and skepticism. Inflationists,
such as David Chalmers (2002), hold “Modal Monism”, the view that
there is only one modal notion or primitive, such that metaphysical and
logical modality coincide (more below, §4.1). Deflationists, such as
Sydney Shoemaker (1998), argue that metaphysical modality coincides
with physical modality. Skeptics, such as Graham Priest (2021), question
whether there is a notion of metaphysical necessity that is distinct from
both, analytic necessity (which corresponds to conceptual necessity) and
physical necessity.
Metaphysical modality is the modality that is typically at stake in
philosophical argumentation (e.g., St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument,
Rene Descartes’ Argument for Mind-Body Dualism, George Berkeley’s
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Argument for Idealism). Accordingly, the Access Question in the
epistemology of modality focuses on how we can access metaphysical
modality. Besides investigating the modal status of philosophical
propositions, modal epistemologists are also interested in answering
common every-day modal questions, such as, could the couch be on the
other side of the room? Can Mary climb the tree? Can the cup fit in the
drawer?
Some philosophers have recently approached the epistemology of
metaphysical modality by first investigating whether some every-day
propositions are practically possible (as opposed to metaphysically
possible) (e.g., Strohminger 2015 and Vetter forthcoming). Whether some
proposition  is practically possible hinges on some specific
circumstances that are held fixed in a situation—for example, given a
particular subject’s physical abilities, or certain environmental conditions.
While it seems uncontroversial that it is metaphysically possible to get the
couch to the other side of the room, a specific subject might wonder
whether it is practically possible for her to do so, given certain
circumstances.
This raises a Navigation Question: How are we to epistemically navigate
from practical modality to metaphysical modality? Given that we know
that  is practically possible, how do we come to know that it is
metaphysically possible? Is this done via some (implicit or explicit)
inferential transition? If so, does that imply that we need knowledge of
some bridge principle between practical and metaphysical possibility?
Here it is useful to see the contrast between the Access Question and the
Navigation Question again. While the former asks how we initially get
epistemic access to the modal realm without relying on modal premises,
the latter asks about how we epistemically navigate from one “sphere” or
kind of modality to another. We will see that while the Access Question
p
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has traditionally been the main focus in the literature, some recent
accounts (like, e.g., Strohminger’s (2015), Vetter’s (forthcoming), and, in
a sense, Chalmers’ (2002)) a Navigation Question takes center stage.
2. Classification Schemes in the Epistemology of
Modality
There are many theories of modal knowledge, and many ways to classify
them. In this article we proceed based on the following main categories:
2.1 Mental Capacities and Inferential Methods
The distinction between mental capacities and inferential methods is a
natural starting point for addressing the Access Question. The mental
capacities that are most discussed in the epistemology of modality are:
conceivability, understanding, imagination, intuition, and perception. The
inferential methods are: deduction, induction, and abduction. We will see
how those notions are spelled out more precisely in the different theories.
Mental capacities and/or inferential methods that are central to a theory of
modal knowledge offer a main criterion for classifying theories.
Furthermore, theories of modal knowledge need not restrict themselves to
adopting only one mental capacity or inferential method. In fact, they
sometimes combine them in various ways.
Theories should not only investigate which specific capacities and
methods are involved with modal knowledge, but also in virtue of what
such capacities and methods yield the correct results. Mallozzi (2021e)
accordingly distinguishes between descriptive and normative tasks with
regard to modal reasoning and modal knowledge. The descriptive task
involves identifying and describing the belief-formation processes and
methods that subjects actually carry out in modal reasoning (for example
counterfactual reasoning, or deductive inference). The descriptive task
The Epistemology of Modality
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does not in itself involve answering the question of how the processes are
truth-conducive. This question takes center stage in the normative task,
which targets the correctness conditions for such processes and methods.
More precisely, a chief normative task for the epistemology of modality is
to elucidate what constrains such processes or methods, i.e., in virtue of
what their outputs are correct or incorrect. As a normative inquiry, the
epistemology of modality is centrally concerned with what Vaidya and
Wallner (2021) call the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction (PMEF).
This problem concerns the normative restrictions on candidate capacities
or methods. Take, e.g., imagination as a candidate mental capacity in our
pursuit for modal knowledge. In order for us to be properly guided to
modal knowledge, we cannot apply imagination in a completely
unrestricted manner. If no restrictions would apply, we could imagine all
sorts of impossible things like water without hydrogen, transparent iron
etc. Hence, some restrictions, or “epistemic friction creators”, as Vaidya
and Wallner call them, have to be in place. The PMEF asks what the
epistemic friction creators are and how we come to know them or at least
how we come to adequately deploy them in our application of various
capacities and methods in order to be properly guided to modal
knowledge.
While descriptive tasks and normative tasks are distinct, they need not be
pursued independently. Normative modal epistemology may, for example,
be informed by empirical psychology (the study of counterfactuals is a
prominent example), and vice-versa.
2.2 Necessity-First vs. Possibility-First
Hale (2002) draws an important distinction between two different
architectures one can use in building an epistemology of modality.
Necessity-first accounts hold that we first acquire knowledge of necessity
and then arrive at knowledge of possibility by inferring what is consistent
Antonella Mallozzi, Anand Vaidya, and Michael Wallner




with what we know to be necessary. Possibility-first accounts, by contrast,
hold that we first acquire knowledge of possibility from which we then
generalize to knowledge of necessity. Most conceivability-based accounts
(§4.1) implement a possibility-first approach. So do dispositionalist
approaches as well as Roca-Royes’ similarity-based account, as they all
prioritize possibilities (§7). Counterfactual-based accounts such as
Williamson’s (§4.2) seem instead more neutral concerning the distinction.
Finally, essence-based accounts (§5) are usually necessity-first. (For
discussion see: Hale (2013), Roca-Royes (2017), and Fischer (2017)).
2.3 Modal Rationalism vs. Modal Empiricism
Kant famously argued that what is a priori coincides with what is
necessary, thereby ruling out the category of a posteriori necessities.
However, Kripke (1971) pointed out that there are necessary truths that
can only be known a posteriori. The contemporary distinction between
modal rationalism and modal empiricism moves off of Kripke’s (1971)
deduction model for knowledge of a posteriori necessities. According to
Kripke, we proceed based on the conditional “If , then necessarily ”,
where “ ” stands for some fact we can discover via empirical
investigation. For example,
If Hesperus = Phosphorus, then necessarily (Hesperus = Phosphorus)
Hesperus = Phosphorus
Necessarily, (Hesperus = Phosphorus)
(K1)—one of the so-called “Kripke conditionals”—is a modal premise
that instantiates “If , then necessarily ”, which he suggests is something
we know “by a priori philosophical analysis” (1971: 180; 1980: 108). On
the other hand, (K2) is a non-modal, factual premise that we may come to
know empirically. It was an empirical discovery that the celestial body that
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we call “Phosphorus” for its morning sightings, namely the planet Venus.
As a consequence of the empirical contribution of (K2), the conclusion of
the argument, (K3), is also a posteriori. (For further discussion, see
Casullo 1977, 2010; Peacocke 1999). Note that not all instances of “If ,
then necessarily ” will be true. In this paradigm case,  is an identity
statement involving rigid designators on both sides. These statements are
such that if true, they are necessarily true, which is something most
philosophers hold we can know a priori. (See also the entry on rigid
designation).
Modal rationalists accept and accommodate Kripkean a posteriori
necessities by emphasizing that in a Kripkean inference (K1)–(K3), the
modal part, (K1), is known a priori. Not all epistemologists endorse a
deductive picture.
In general, modal rationalists prioritize a priori methods for acquiring
knowledge of metaphysical modality.
By contrast, modal empiricists pursue a posteriori accounts of knowledge
of metaphysical modality. Often they still acknowledge that a priori
methods might contribute to modal knowledge. (See Fischer & Leon
2017)
Some philosophers have challenged the philosophical significance of the a
priori/a posteriori distinction (e.g., Hawthorne 2007; Sosa 2013;
Williamson 2007, 2013; for discussion: Casullo 2015). We discuss
Williamson’s version of the challenge in §4.2.
3. Skepticism and Knowability
Skepticism about modal knowledge has received attention in the literature
since van Inwagen’s (1998) seminal paper. In this entry we largely assume
that one can have some knowledge (or justified belief) about modality. We
p
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will only briefly present the issues and refer to the relevant literature for
further discussion.
There are two broadly skeptical challenges in the contemporary literature.
The Integration Challenge (Peacocke 1999): This challenge is modelled
after the Benacerraf Problem for Platonism in the philosophy of
mathematics. According to Benacerraf (1973) any robustly realist
(platonist) stance about mathematical objects like numbers regards them
as abstract entities outside of space and time, i.e., as “platonic” entities. As
such, they seem inaccessible to us. Unlike ordinary perceptible objects, to
which we have a causal connection, it is unclear how we might detect
platonic entities in order to know about them, since we have no causal
connection to them. The possibilities and necessities that modal statements
are about also seem to be outside of space and time and thus our epistemic
access to them seems mysterious. So, on a par with the Benacerraf
Problem in the philosophy of mathematics, the Integration Challenge in
the philosophy of modality consists in providing a plausible account of
how we know modal statements, which at the same time fits our modal
metaphysics (see, e.g., Bueno & Shalkowski 2000; Fischer 2018; Roca-
Royes 2020 for discussion).
The Reliability Challenge (Nozick 2001): If we are to be justified in
believing modal statements, we must have a reliable faculty or a set of
reliable faculties working together for forming beliefs of that sort, the
existence of which is best explained by evolutionary theory. No ad hoc
modality-detecting faculty is allowed for explaining modal knowledge.
The Reliability Challenge instantiates the desiderata of what is sometimes
called “anti-exceptionalism” in modal epistemology, according to which
our knowledge of metaphysical modality is continuous with our
everyday knowledge about the world. (Vetter 2016: 766)
The Epistemology of Modality
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Skepticism about extraordinary or philosophical cases varies across
theories. Van Inwagen (1998) voices skepticism about extraordinary cases
by an analogy with vision. We do and should withhold judgment
concerning what we see, when it is outside the range of reliability in our
field of vision. For the farther out objects are in our field of vision, the less
reliable we are at judging them. Similarly, we ought to withhold judgment
concerning what we conceive or imagine or infer about modal reality,
when they are outside the range of reliability of the specified capacity or
method (for discussion: Barnes 2002, Geirsson 2005, and Strohminger &
Yli-Vakkuri 2018).
Van Inwagen’s moderate skepticism draws attention to the issue of the
scope of our modal knowledge. Which modal propositions are knowable,
if any? We can ask whether a certain account targets knowledge of just
one kind of modality, or more. Focusing on one kind of modality, we can
also ask whether a given theory aims to account for our access to the
whole range of (knowable) modal propositions (from the every-day ones
to the philosophical ones, from those about abstracta to those about
concreta, etc.), or merely to some of them. In the former case the theory
might be labeled ambitious, in the latter, modest (see Wirling 2020). Some
modest theories, for instance, aim to offer an account of ordinary modal
knowledge, which involves what is possible and necessary for couches
and cups, say; but they are either skeptical or silent about extraordinary or
philosophical cases, such as whether the number 2 could have been the
number 3 or whether there could have been philosophical zombies—i.e., a
creature that is physically identical in every respect to a human being but
lacks all phenomenal consciousness.
Antonella Mallozzi, Anand Vaidya, and Michael Wallner
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4. Conceivability, Imagination, Intuition, and
Understanding
Historically, the notions of imagination, conceivability, intuition, and
understanding have been prominent in explaining modal knowledge. For
Descartes, the source of our modal knowledge is a distinctive sort of
intellectual grasp based on understanding, which might be interpreted as a
kind of conceiving, or intuiting. For Hume, it is imagination as an
experientially-informed cognitive faculty that is a guide to knowledge of
possibility (see Gendler & Hawthorne 2002). This Humean tradition has
been pursued in the early stages of post-Kripkean discussions of the
epistemology of modality by a number of authors, and it has maintained a
central role in more recent discussions.
4.1 Conceivability
In ordinary pre-theoretical talk, “conceiving” and “imagining” may well
be used interchangeably; and often philosophers, too, treat those terms
roughly as synonymous. In the literature on the epistemology of modality,
however, conceivability is a technical notion, which may be defined in
different ways. These are mainly stipulative choices, but it is important to
flag terminological variations across different theories.
Both Stephen Yablo (1993) and David Chalmers (1996, 2002, 2004, 2010:
Ch. 6) have developed independent accounts of conceivability as a source
of modal knowledge (for yet another account based on response-
dependence, see Menzies 1998). Yablo holds that, when adequately
understood, conceivability provides defeasible evidence for possibility. In
Yablo’s account, the relevant notion of conceivability involves the
imaginability of a situation in which a conceived proposition is taken to be
true by the subject in question. Yablo offers the following two conditionals
The Epistemology of Modality
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(CON)
(INC)
for describing the appropriate philosophical notion of conceivability
which provides evidence of possibility (1993: 29)
 is conceivable for , if  can imagine a world that  takes to
verify .
 is inconceivable for , if  cannot imagine any world that 
takes to verify .
Yablo’s philosophical conceivability (CON), involves imagining a world
that one takes to verify some proposition . Note that when imagining a
world, we don’t need to specify all the details in the world in imagination.
The imagining provides prima facie evidence for the possibility of 
because it involves what Yablo calls an “appearance of possibility” (i.e., it
seems as if  is possible, given the imagined world). “[T]o imagine an  is
thereby to enjoy the appearance that an  could exist” (1993: 30).
Importantly, for Yablo, conceivability, thus understood, helps address a
pressing challenge from the post-Kripkean literature, namely the issue of
modal error. This is the issue of explaining what the sources of our
erroneous modal judgments are (see, e.g., Bealer 2004 and Yablo 2006).
While modal error can in principle affect both a priori and empirical
modal reasoning, Yablo focuses on the challenge to conceivability as a
guide to possibility that arises from Kripke’s cases of the necessary a
posteriori. Not being aware of the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus, I
might find it conceivable that one exists without the other; thereby I
conclude that it is possible for Hesperus to exist without Phosphorus. But
that is a modal error. So how does Yablo’s conceivability do us any good?
For him, conceivability-based evidence is positive defeasible evidence of
possibility. When properly understood as specified by (CON),
conceivability confers prima facie justification for the modal belief in
question. Yablo draws an analogy with perception, which is also a fallible
source of knowledge. He argues that in the case of perception, the
p X X X
p
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(WMR)
possibility of error and illusions does not keep us from assigning prima
facie justification for beliefs based on perception. Similarly, the possibility
of modal error in conceivability does not undermine the thesis that
conceivability provides prima facie evidence for possibility. Although for
Yablo there is a difference between conceivability and perception that
makes the former provide more doubtful evidence, the difference is not a
matter of fallibility or likelihood of error. Rather, the difference for Yablo
lies in the fact that we have a much better story of how perceptual error
comes about compared to modal error (see also van Inwagen’s 1998
discussion of modal skepticism based on the analogy with vision, as well
as Bealer 2004 for discussion of the sources of modal error). This is also
true of debates about intuition as a source of justification (see Weinberg
2007). However, while Yablo’s notion of philosophical conceivability can
answer criticism based on the possibility of modal error, he concedes that
more work needs to be done to produce an exhaustive account of modal
error that will best guard us against it.
Chalmers (1996, 2002, 2010: Ch. 6) affirms an even stronger link between
conceivability and possibility than Yablo. When adequately understood,
conceivability entails possibility, as opposed to merely providing evidence
for possibility. More precisely, the main thesis of Chalmers’ Weak Modal
Rationalism is
Ideal, positive, primary conceivability entails primary
possibility:
(WMR) is constructed out of three distinctions:
i. prima facie vs. ideal conceivability
ii. positive vs. negative conceivability
iii. primary vs. secondary conceivability and possibility
The Epistemology of Modality
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Prima facie conceivability is one’s initial assessment of whether a
described hypothesis is possible, without engaging in careful reasoning
about the hypothesis. Better reasoning often gives one reason to doubt
prima facie conceivability. Ideal conceivability, by contrast, involves a
kind of reasoning that cannot be weakened by further reasoning. If some
proposition is ideally conceivable, then that proposition is the case from
the perspective of a hypothetical reasoner who is “free of all cognitive
limitations” (Chalmers 2002: 148) and free from error due to lack of
attention. For Chalmers this is sufficient for ideal reasoning to be safe
from modal error. This is why, for Chalmers, an entailment link between
conceivability and possibility can be forged only when ideal
conceivability is in play.
Positive conceivability amounts to coherently imagining a scenario in
which something is the case. The aim is to “form some sort of clear and
distinct conception of a situation in which the hypothesis is true”
(Chalmers 2010: 144). It need not be a complete description of a scenario,
but it must be sufficiently detailed so as to verify the statement being
considered. By contrast, negative conceivability is the inability to a priori
rule out a certain scenario. That is, negative conceivability amounts to
one’s inability to rule out a possibility as incoherent based on what one
knows. This is often weaker than positive conceivability, since it often
derives from ignorance of the relevant facts. For example, if one does not
know that water is H2O, they may find the statement “water might not
contain hydrogen” conceivable because they cannot rule out the statement
as a priori incoherent. Conceiving of water without hydrogen in the
positive sense, on the other hand, requires constructing a scenario in which
water is present without hydrogen at the relevant depth of detail required
to verify the claim. Arguably, that sort of scenario cannot be constructed
once one knows the relevant empirical facts, since if they are attentively
engaged in the construction they will notice a contradiction between water
being H2O and hydrogen being absent.
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Finally, the distinction between primary and secondary conceivability and
possibility pertains to Chalmers’ version of Two-Dimensional Semantics.
His Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2-D) proposes a way to
address the challenge posed by Kripkean a posteriori necessities, namely
the apparent problem that a posteriori impossibilities like “water is not
H2O” seem conceivable. In response, Chalmers holds that “water is not
H2O” is not secondarily conceivable, though it is still primarily
conceivable. What exactly does this mean?
The main idea of (E2-D) is that there are two different ways in which we
can evaluate statements across possible worlds, i.e., two different ways of
conceiving hypothetical situations, based on two different constraints.
The first constraint binds what is true in some possible world to what one
knows a priori. A statement is primarily conceivable if nothing that is
knowable a priori is incompatible with the statement being true. As
Chalmers explains, that captures a kind of epistemic possibility. Consider
again the statement “water is not H2O”. The actual chemical composition
of water, H2O, is not knowable a priori. So this fact does not constrain
what is true in the possible worlds in which the existence of water is a
priori conceivable. Accordingly, “water is not H2O” is primarily
conceivable. As Chalmers also puts it, primary conceivability amounts to
coherently conceiving the situation described as actual, namely as a way
the world might turn out to be.
By contrast, it has been discovered empirically that water is H2O. The
second constraint binds what is true at other possible worlds to facts about
how things actually are. As Chalmers explains, that captures a kind of
subjunctive possibility. Since chemical composition is arguably essential
to substances, such as water, it is not secondarily conceivable that water is
not H2O. As Chalmers also puts it, secondary conceivability amounts to
The Epistemology of Modality
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(PrimC)
(SecC)
coherently conceiving the situation described as counterfactual, namely as
a way the world might have been, given how our world is. Thus:
A statement  is primarily conceivable when it is conceivable
that the situation described in  is actually the case.
A statement  is secondarily conceivable when it is
conceivable that the situation described in  might
counterfactually have been the case. (cf. Chalmers 2002: 157)
To further clarify, for Chalmers expressions have two dimensions of
meaning or content: a primary intension and a secondary intension. In the
case of sentences describing Kripkean a posteriori necessities like “water
is H2O”, these are two different propositions. The primary intension of an
expression like, e.g., “water”, picks out a referent at a world considered as
actual; namely, roughly based on the descriptive content that a speaker a
priori associates with the expression. Thus, at any world we consider, the
primary intension of “water” picks out whatever substance satisfies some
description such as “the liquid drinkable stuff in lakes and rivers etc.” (or,
otherwise put, whatever plays the water role). At any world we consider as
actual, “water” will pick out such a substance. Secondary intensions, by
contrast, pick out the referent of an expression at a world considered as
counterfactual, namely based on the way a speaker evaluates a given
expression counterfactually, given how the actual world is. That requires
acknowledging that water is H2O. Assuming, as usual, that having a
certain chemical composition is essential to being a certain kind of
substance, the secondary intension of “water” picks out H2O compounds
at all worlds (otherwise put, it picks out what actually plays the water
role). At any world we consider as counterfactual, “water” will pick out
H2O. Accordingly, sentences like “water is H2O” are secondarily
necessary but primarily contingent. For, while it is possible that the liquid
drinkable stuff in rivers and lakes etc. is not H2O, it is not possible that
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conceivability allows us to access a specific kind of possibility, namely
primary possibility, which are sometimes secondarily impossible. While
there is a primary possibility in which water isn’t H2O, there is no
secondary possibility in which water isn’t H2O.
However, primary possibility is no less “real” than secondary possibility.
Chalmers argues that there is only one space of worlds or that
“conceptual=logical=metaphysical possibility (at the level of worlds)”
(1999: 478). This is what he calls “Modal Monism”. What varies, within
modal space, is not the kind of worlds we are considering (namely
“merely” logically-conceptually possible versus “genuinely”
metaphysically possible); but rather the truth-values of the expressions
under examination at a given world, depending on whether we consider
their primary or secondary intensions. Because of Modal Monism, within
Chalmers’ framework every primary possibility is thus a metaphysical
possibility, though it might not be a secondary possibility. “Water is not
H2O” is ideally positively primarily conceivable, and therefore primary
possible. Given Modal Monism, Chalmers can thus argue that “water is
not H2O” is a metaphysical possibility, while also resisting the challenge
posed by the Kripkean a posteriori necessities. For “water is not H2O” is a
primary possibility but not a secondary possibility, given that “water”
actually picks out H2O.
So, by adopting Modal Monism, Chalmers places primary possibility
within the same modal realm as secondary possibility. This guarantees that
primary possibility is no less “real” or “genuine” than secondary
possibility (indeed, as Chalmers puts it, “these worlds are all first-class
metaphysical possibilities” [2002: 165]) Thus, the kind of possibility that
is entailed by primary, positive, ideal conceivability, is a metaphysical one.
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Critical Questions for Conceivability
The Connection Question: This is the central question that conceivability
theorists like Yablo and Chalmers try to answer. How is conceivability
connected to possibility? Given that metaphysical modality is an objective
modality that is mind-independent, while conceivability is subject-
sensitive and mind-dependent, how are the two connected such that
conceivability may entail, or at least provide evidence for possibility?
Answering the Connection Question should thus clarify how mind-
dependent conceivability may provide one with justification for believing
that something is mind-independently possible.
The Scope Question: This question further specifies the Connection
Question, by asking how conceivability can effectively cast light on
matters of metaphysical possibility, as opposed to logical-conceptual
possibility. Remember that primary conceivability is a purely a priori
exercise based on considerations of (ideal) logical and conceptual
coherence of a described scenario. What ensures that conceivability
exercises so constrained successfully capture metaphysical modality?
Within Chalmers’ framework: what ensures that primary possibilities are
themselves metaphysical possibilities? Several philosophers have argued
that assuming Modal Monism is not a satisfying answer (for discussion:
Soames 2004; Vaidya 2008; Mallozzi 2021b).
The Navigation Question: Granted (WMR), we might still wonder about
knowledge of secondary possibility. Is there any a priori way of inferring
secondary possibility from primary possibility? Simply put: can we
navigate a priori from primary to secondary possibility? Chalmers thinks
that in some special cases we can. Such cases require that an expression’s
primary and secondary intensions coincide. Candidate examples include,
most notably, the class of phenomenal truths as well as mathematical and
analytic truths (Chalmers 2010: ch. 6). However, that raises a worry that
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on Chalmers’ conceivability theory we won’t be able to have a priori
access to most of the modal metaphysical realm. Conceivability seems a
limited resource for knowledge of metaphysical modality.
The Dependence Question: Suppose conceivability does provide
justification for believing that something is possible. Does it succeed in
doing so because conceivability operates on some prior beliefs about the
considered scenario? For example, does conceivability guide one to the
belief that a round square is impossible because one knows what squares
and circles are, and by examining their definition one can arrive safely at
the conclusion that such objects are impossible? Similarly, does one
simply find water in the absence of hydrogen possible because one either
suppresses the knowledge that water contains hydrogen or one does not
know that water does contain hydrogen? In the first case, conceivability
would seem to depend, to an important extent on, underlying linguistic or
conceptual knowledge (along the lines of analytic accounts of the a priori
more generally). In the second case, conceivability would depend on both
linguistic or conceptual knowledge and empirical knowledge. In both
cases, additional essentialist knowledge might be needed (e.g., Kment
2021; Goff 2021; and Roca-Royes 2011a). In Vaidya and Wallner’s
(2021), (§2), the critical point of the Dependence Question is the
following: In order for our conceivability exercises to appropriately justify
our modal judgments, those conceivability exercises need to be
constrained by some crucial information about the (essence of) the entities
involved in them, creating the needed epistemic friction for conceivability.
In effect, the Dependence Question is concerned with the issue of the
source of modal knowledge. Is conceivability an ultimate source of modal
knowledge, or is it derivative, namely dependent on another source, such
as linguistic or conceptual knowledge and essentialist knowledge? (see
also Berto & Schoonen 2018).
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The Human Capacity Question: Conceivability theorists hold that, under
appropriate conditions, conceivability provides justification for believing
that something is possible. We saw how Yablo and Chalmers spell out
such conditions in presenting their respective notions of conceivability.
But clarifying what the relevant conditions are for conceivability to yield
modal knowledge still leaves open an important question. Do humans ever
satisfy those conditions? For example, one might agree with Chalmers that
some ideal sort of conceivability entails possibility, but also question
whether we can satisfy the requirements of ideal rational reflection (see,
e.g., Worley 2003 and Martínez 2013).
The Relevant Depth Question: This targets the content of the imagined
situation or world that the subject takes to verify some proposition . In
what detail do we have to imagine a world  in order for the fact that 
seems true in  to confer evidence for the possibility of ? (see van
Inwagen 1998) The issue of relevant depth has to do with what imagined
details are needed to justify a possibility judgment, e.g., is it enough to
imagine a human brain functioning normally while not having any
experiences to justify the possibility of a philosophical zombie?
The Self-Defeat Question: Suppose that some thesis according to which a
certain sort of conceivability entails a certain sort of possibility—call it
(CP)—is true. Is it then conceivable that (CP) is false? If that is
conceivable, or so Howell (2008) and Mizrahi and Morrow (2015) have
argued, then, by (CP), it is possible that (CP) is false. However, if (CP) is
possibly false, (CP) is actually false. For a counterexample to the
entailment relation falsifies the entailment relation. Thus, if we can
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4.2 Counterfactual Imagination
Timothy Williamson (2007) has developed a theory of modal knowledge
based on our capacity for counterfactual reasoning, which distinctively
deploys imagination in the development of a counterfactual. The topic of
imagination has gained widespread attention in contemporary debates
within philosophy, logic, and the cognitive sciences. The focus has been
on the epistemic uses of imagination for both quotidian non-modal
knowledge (e.g., knowledge of others’ mental states, learning, planning
and decision making) as well as various kinds of modal knowledge (see,
e.g., Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; Kind & Kung 2016; Kind 2020; Badura
& Kind 2021; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson 2003; Nichols 2006).
Theories of modal epistemology that rely to various extents on
imagination need not be rationalist; in fact, they are often empiricist. Here
we only discuss Williamson’s counterfactual imagination account. For
further work on imagination-based accounts, whether rationalist or
empiricist, see, e.g., Gregory (2004, 2010, 2020), Byrne (2007), Kung
(2010), Ichikawa and Jarvis (2012), Casullo (2012a), and Lam (2018) (On
the other hand, note that Hill 2006, Kroedel 2012, and Kment 2014 have
offered theories of modal knowledge that variously appeal to
counterfactuals and counterfactual reasoning, which do not centrally
involve imagination).
Williamson’s central thesis is that knowledge of metaphysical modality is
a “special case” of knowledge of counterfactual conditionals. As he puts
it,
the ordinary cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual
conditionals carries with it the cognitive capacity to handle
metaphysical modality. (2007: 136)
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(NEC)
(POS)
The capacity for modal knowledge can thus be thought of as a byproduct
of our capacity for counterfactual thinking. For Williamson counterfactual
thinking is largely imaginative thinking. When we assess a given
counterfactual, we evaluate the consequent on the supposition of the
antecedent by developing the supposition through an imaginative exercise.
This typically involves the “offline” application of our cognitive
capacities. More precisely, Williamson holds that in imagination we often
transpose “online” cognitive skills that are originally developed in
perception into corresponding offline cognitive skills (2013).
Williamson supports the thesis that knowledge of metaphysical modality is
a special case of imaginative counterfactual knowledge with logical
equivalences between sentences using counterfactual operators and modal
operators, aimed at showing that statements of possibility and necessity
can be reformulated in counterfactual terms in a straightforward way:
 
(it is necessary that  iff if it were not the case that  a
contradiction would follow)
 
(it is possible that  iff it is not the case that if  were true a
contradiction would follow)
Thus, we can identify the following two key theses in Williamson’s
counterfactual theory:
Logical Equivalence: metaphysical possibility and necessity can be
proven to be logically equivalent to counterfactual conditionals.
Epistemic Pathway: the method of counterfactual development carried
out in imagination can provide one with knowledge of
metaphysical modality.
◻A iff  (¬A ◻ ⊥)→
A A
◊A iff  ¬(A ◻ ⊥)→
A A
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The two are importantly interconnected in that Epistemic Pathway is
partly based on Logical Equivalence. As Williamson puts it,
Relying on equivalences (POS) and (NEC), we come to know about
possibility and necessity by developing counterfactual suppositions in
imagination in a search for a contradiction.
In order to see how this works, let us first look at an evaluation of an
“ordinary” every-day counterfactual. Consider the following example
from Williamson:
As Williamson explains, the general procedure we use to arrive at (Rock)
is the following:
modulo the implicit recognition of this equivalence, the
epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is tantamount to a
special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking. (2007:
158)
(Rock)
Suppose that you are in the mountains. As the sun melts the ice,
rocks embedded in it are loosened and crash down the slope. You
notice one rock slide into a bush. You wonder where it would have
ended if the bush had not been there. A natural way to answer the
question is by visualizing the rock sliding without the bush there,
then bouncing down the slope into the lake at the bottom. Under
suitable background conditions, you thereby come to know the
counterfactual:
If the bush had not been there, the rock would have
ended in the lake (2007: 142)
[O]ne supposes the antecedent and develops the supposition,
adding further judgments within the supposition by reasoning,
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(Rock-POS)
The same procedure can be applied to evaluate the counterfactuals that
figure in (NEC) and (POS), in order to gain modal knowledge. Based on
the logical equivalence in (POS), we can come to know “ ” by knowing
“ ”. And we know the latter through a counterfactual
development, much like in the (Rock) example. For example, we might
assess whether it is metaphysically possible for the rock to have ended in
the lake, by using the logical equivalence (POS). The simple procedure
will be to counterfactually suppose that the rock did end in the lake and
check whether a contradiction would follow, as we develop that
supposition in imagination as “realistically” as we can (2007: 142).
If the rock had ended in the lake no contradiction would
have followed.
If (Rock-POS) is true, we are warranted in asserting that it is
metaphysically possible for the rock to have ended in the lake.
In addition, based on the logical equivalence (NEC), we can come to know
“ ” by knowing “ ”. And we know the latter through a
counterfactual development of the antecedent of the counterfactual (“
offline predictive mechanisms, and other offline judgments. The
imagining may but need not be perceptual imagining. All of one’s
background beliefs are available from within the scope of the
supposition as a description of one’s actual circumstances for the
purposes of comparison with the counterfactual circumstances…
Some but not all of one’s background knowledge and beliefs are
also available within the scope of the supposition as a description
of the counterfactual circumstances, according to complex
criteria… To a first approximation: one asserts the counterfactual
conditional if and only if the development [of the antecedent]
eventually leads one to add the consequent. (2007: 152–153)
⋄A
¬(A ◻ ⊥)→
◻A ¬A ◻ ⊥→
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”), much like in the (Rock) example. If the counterfactual development
of “ ” yields a contradiction (i.e., the consequent of the counterfactual in
question), we assent to the counterfactual and thereby come to know that
A is necessary. To take another example from Williamson:
We thereby come to know that it is necessary that gold is the element with
atomic number 79.
On Williamson's account we can generally trust our capacity for assessing
counterfactual conditionals in imagination, as this is informed and
disciplined by a great amount of background knowledge concerning the
workings of nature. This background information includes general
knowledge of chemical, physical, and other basic scientific facts, as well
as some grasp of the causal and natural laws. On any given occasion, we
keep some of this background knowledge fixed within the scope of the
supposition as we carry out our counterfactual evaluations. Goodman’s
(1955) classical problem of cotenability concerns the question of which
facts or beliefs are cotenable with the antecedent of the counterfactual
conditional. That is, which facts or beliefs are to be held fixed in a
counterfactual development? As we will see, many have raised concerns
about what to count as cotenable when evaluating a counterfactual
supposition. Crucially, background knowledge also involves some grasp of
“constitutive” facts, as Williamson sometimes calls them. These
apparently include essentialist facts and principles—for example,
Williamson mentions Kripke’s principle of the necessity of origins, which
holds that the material origins of an entity are essential to it.
¬A
¬A
If we know enough chemistry, our counterfactual development of
the supposition that gold is [not] the element with atomic number
79 will generate a contradiction. (2007: 164)
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There is also a more general reason why Williamson’s method for modal
knowledge should be reliable. Williamson stresses that knowledge of
counterfactuals is pervasive for human decision-making, planning, and
theory construction in science (2007). In his (2016) he further conjectures
that imagination as a source of knowledge might even have given us an
evolutionary advantage as a species, as opposed to being a mere accidental
byproduct of our evolutionary history. Thus, insofar as modal knowledge
proceeds via the reliable method of counterfactual development in
imagination, we should also rest assured that we will get at the right
answers concerning matters of metaphysical modality. (Note that this may
offer an answer against Nozick’s 2001 evolution-based skepticism about
our knowledge of metaphysical modality).
Furthermore, for Williamson modal knowledge typically has a special
epistemic status which is in between the a priori and a posteriori
categories. In Williamson’s terminology, the kind of knowledge in
question is “armchair”. That is, on the one hand, the knowledge in
question isn’t strictly a posteriori, since apparently we can’t fully derive it
from empirical experience. And, on the other hand, such knowledge
doesn’t fit the model of a priori knowledge, either, since arguably
background information from science, and experiential contribution more
generally, plays a role that goes beyond merely enabling concept
possession and use. Williamson also contends that the a priori / a
posteriori distinction is in general too superficial or it “doesn’t cut at the
epistemic joints” (2013: 8. For discussion, see e.g. Boghossian 2011,
Boghossian and Williamson 2020; Casullo 2013; Jenkins 2008; Mallozzi
2021d; Malmgren 2011).
Williamson’s view straddles the division between rationalist and
empiricist accounts. Thus, for Williamson we can gain knowledge of
metaphysical modality thanks to a combination of
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i. our capacity for carrying out counterfactual reasoning in imagination,
as constrained by our background knowledge of the world (Epistemic
Pathway),
together with
ii. suitable logical equivalences that guarantee that modal statements are
equivalent to counterfactual statements (Logical Equivalence).
Critical Questions for Counterfactual Theory
We can divide the central critical questions for Williamson’s
counterfactual theory based on whether they target (Epistemic Pathway) or
(Logical Equivalence) more specifically. We start with the latter.
Against (Logical Equivalence)
The Counterpossibles Question: Some philosophers question
Williamson’s purported logical equivalence between counterfactual
statements and modal statements (Berto, French, Priest, & Ripley 2018;
Jago 2021). Particularly, in order for (NEC) to hold, one has to accept that
all counterpossibles (namely counterfactual conditionals with impossible
antecedents) are vacuously true. But this is controversial. Many have
given arguments defending false counterpossibles based on modal
semantics that include impossible worlds (e.g., Berto et al. 2018; Brogaard
& Salerno 2013; Jago 2013; Nolan 1997; Restall 1997). Questioning the
truth of Williamson’s logical equivalences might constitute a challenge for
the overall theory of modal knowledge, since, as we saw, (Epistemic
Pathway) is partly based on (Logical Equivalence).
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Against (Epistemic Pathway)
The Epistemic Fallacy Question: Some contend that even if
Williamson’s purported equivalences are true, it doesn’t follow that we
know metaphysical modality through the same cognitive processes by
which we know counterfactual conditionals (Jenkins 2008; Casullo 2012b;
for discussion see Yli-Vakkuri 2013). Modal reasoning might well require
using different cognitive-epistemic methods than those we supposedly
employ in counterfactual reasoning. For example, imagination might not
play an epistemic role in the acquisition of modal knowledge. Appealing
to a logical equivalence, while perhaps necessary, is not sufficient for
establishing the correct epistemology. Otherwise put, (Logical
Equivalence) doesn’t suffice for (Epistemic Pathway).
The Circularity Question: Several authors have critically pointed out
that Williamson’s method of counterfactual evaluation appears to rely on
pre-existing knowledge of what Williamson sometimes calls “constitutive
facts”. These are most commonly taken as facts about the essence of
objects. Now, if we take essentialist facts to be modal in that the essence
of something is the way it must be, this reliance is problematic for it might
make Williamson’s epistemology of modality circular (see, e.g.,
Boghossian 2011; Tahko 2012; Roca-Royes 2011b). In response,
Williamson might contend that his account is not meant to reduce modal
knowledge to counterfactual knowledge, but rather only to clarify how the
one may be a special case or byproduct of the other (Morato 2019).
Furthermore, Williamson might hold that subjects need not have explicit
modal knowledge in order to carry out their counterfactual evaluations,
namely they need not know that some facts are necessary. Instead, subjects
only need to be somehow reliably sensitive to those facts (Yli-Vakkuri
2013; for discussion see Vaidya & Wallner 2021).
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The Normative Constraints Question: Let us assume that there is no real
threat of circularity for Williamson’s account. Several authors point out
that the background knowledge that one needs to keep fixed in our
counterfactual evaluations is still problematic in a number of ways. One
classical question concerning the evaluation of counterfactuals is the
problem of cotenability. Which facts or beliefs are cotenable with the
antecedent of the counterfactual conditional? Which background
knowledge or information do we hold fixed? For example, to investigate
the counterfactual “If the bush had not been there, the rock would have
bounced into the lake” we imaginatively consider what would happen to
the rock if the bush had not been there. To do this, we imagine a scenario
without the bush. That is, we dispense with the fact that the bush blocks
the rock. However, do we also dispense with the fact that something (else)
blocks the rock? We might hypothesize that some other obstacle gets in
the way. If we retain this fact as we develop the scenario, then the rock
would have stopped anyway. Yet the truth in the story that Williamson is
assuming is that the rock would have bounced into the lake. So we must
not hold fixed the fact about an obstacle. Why not, though? What principle
determines that in Williamson’s example it is a mistake to hold fixed the
obstacle fact but correct to hold fixed facts like the momentum of the rock
and the presence of the lake?
Williamson broadly appeals to our “sense of how nature works”, which
includes for example some general knowledge of chemistry and physics
(“folk” physics as Williamson says), some grasp of the causal laws, as
well as, more tentatively, certain constitutive or essentialist facts or
principles. But it is not clear what exactly goes into this list, and most
importantly in virtue of what. Williamson’s account arguably leaves the
Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction (see §2) unanswered. In addition,
Tahko (2012) wonders how we should select the relevant background
knowledge and constitutive facts when that involves deciding between
rival scientific hypotheses. Similarly, Roca-Royes (2011b, 2012) questions
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not only whether we possess constitutive knowledge (say, of atomic
numbers); she also remarks that, even if we do possess such knowledge, it
is unclear what cognitive mechanisms are responsible for us reliably
telling apart the constitutive facts from the non-constitutive facts. More
generally, Mallozzi (2021e) argues that while Williamson’s account offers
an important empirical hypothesis concerning the cognitive (imaginative)
processes involved with modal reasoning, it overlooks crucial normative
questions for the epistemology of modality, which involve clarifying what
the relevant constraints on modal reasoning are, and why they count as
correct.
The Scope Question: Several authors doubt that Williamson’s theory
successfully accounts for knowledge of metaphysical modality,
particularly as opposed to causal-nomological modality. For example,
Lowe (2012) argues that since counterfactual knowledge is strictly causal-
nomological knowledge, Williamson’s theory may only explain the latter,
and not knowledge of metaphysical modality. The idea is that Williamson
can’t really explain how we know that water is necessarily H2O unless he
explicitly brings in extra principles—e.g., essentialist principles (for
further arguments to the same effect see, e.g., Deng 2016; Gregory 2017;
Tahko 2012; and Thomasson 2021).
4.3 Intuition and Understanding
The epistemology of modality is importantly connected to the
epistemology of the a priori, as many believe that at least some modal
knowledge is purely a priori (modal rationalism). Some philosophers have
proposed that either intuition or understanding, or both of them combined,
can provide an account of a priori knowledge and justification, which may
be fruitfully applied to the epistemology of modality. Others have
explicitly offered an intuition-based or understanding-based account of
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modal knowledge. (For an empirically informed discussion of intuition see
entry on experimental philosophy.)
Philosophers such as Bealer (1998, 1999a,b ), BonJour (1997), Pust
(2000), Huemer (2001, 2005), Koksvik (2011), and Chudnoff (2013), have
developed accounts of the a priori that appeal to intuition as the source of
a priori knowledge and justification. Most of them take intuition to form a
natural kind of seeming state that is non-reducible to either belief or
inclinations to believe; rather it is sui generis. On the other hand,
philosophers like Boghossian (1996, 2000), Jackson (2000); Hale and
Wright (2000); and Peacocke (1999, 2000) have highlighted various ways
in which appealing to understanding of meaning may contribute to
explaining a priori knowledge and justification. Here we discuss a few
accounts that directly connect the epistemology of the a priori with the
epistemology of modality.
According to BonJour, intuition is a direct grasp or “rational insight” into
“the necessary character of reality” (1997: 107). This occurs when we “see
or grasp or apprehend in a seemingly direct and unmediated way” (1997:
101) the necessity of a proposition. This grasping “depends upon nothing
beyond an understanding of the propositional content itself” (1997: 102).
By explicitly providing knowledge of necessity, intuition, as cashed out by
BonJour, is thus a main source of modal knowledge.
Importantly, many that defend intuition hold that they are fallible and
revisable, and arguably only reliable in certain domains. Still, intuitions
minimally provide prima facie justification, which might be defeated by
further reasoning or empirical evidence. As applied to modal knowledge,
intuitions provide at least prima facie a priori justification for our modal
beliefs and/or for some basic essentialist principles. For example, consider
(RG):
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(RG) Nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time.
BonJour maintains that we directly grasp the necessity of (RG). For him,
(RG) is self-evident or just seems necessarily true. So, on the view that
intuitions justify, our intuitions provide at least prima facie justification for
(RG). (See Levin 2007 for skepticism about the justificatory status of
intuitions in relation to essentialism, such as the essentiality of origins or
fundamental kind; for further discussion see arguments for origin
essentialism in the entry on essential vs. accidental properties.)
George Bealer (1996, 1998, 1999a,b, 2002; Bealer in Bealer & Strawson
1992) integrates understanding and intuition in order to explain knowledge
of modality. As an intuitionist, Bealer takes intuitions to count as (prima
facie) evidence. According to Bealer’s Modal Reliabilism “something is a
basic source of evidence iff it has an appropriate kind of reliable tie to the
truth” (Bealer 1999a: 34). He articulates a notion of determinate
understanding (or determinate concept possession) that casts light on how
our modal intuitions can be appropriately truth-tracking and, thus reliable.
Roughly, determinate understanding (or concept possession) excludes any
partial misunderstanding or incomplete understanding of the concept(s) in
question. It ultimately amounts to a form of understanding that is
incorrigible by improvement of the subject’s cognitive condition or
conceptual repertoire (see Bealer 2002: 104). So, if we determinately
understand a specific concept, we will have truth-tracking intuitions (and
therefore also truth-tracking modal intuitions) about propositions in which
this concept is involved. For example, it is because one determinately
understands the concepts of a square and a triangle, that their intuition that
nothing can be both a square and a triangle is truth-tracking and, thus,
provides them with evidence that it is impossible for something to be both
a square and a triangle.
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Christopher Peacocke (1999, 2002) explicitly puts forward an account of
modal knowledge that appeals to understanding and tacit knowledge of
certain modal principles, while it eschews the role of intuition. Peacocke
tackles the Integration Challenge and, in particular, the fact that we lack a
causal connection to modal facts and properties as commonly understood
in the metaphysical framework of possible worlds. He believes that the
best way to solve the problem is to adopt Moderate Rationalism, which
More precisely, Peacocke holds that understanding of metaphysical
modality, namely the concepts of possibility and necessity, consists in
having implicit knowledge of what he calls Principles of Possibility, which
include principles concerning the rules of concept use, as well as
constitutive (or essentialist) principles. These principles govern
understanding and evaluation of modal discourse and accordingly are
implicitly known and deployed by subjects that correctly understand the
modal concepts. Crucially, for Peacocke, these principles are necessary
truths, and understanding and being able to deploy them is essential to
modal thinking and evaluation. As he puts it,
Importantly, for Peacocke a subject’s tacit knowledge of the Principles of
Possibility and the role these principles play in modal discourse is
modelled on the way in which principles of grammaticality govern how
normal adult speakers understand and evaluate grammaticality in their
native language. For adult speakers arguably have some grasp or tacit
seeks to explain cases of a priori knowledge by appeal to the
nature of the concepts that feature in contents that are known a
priori (2004: 199).
we must be able to identify some of [these principles] if reasoning
within the scope of counterfactual suppositions is to proceed.
(1999: 173)
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knowledge of certain principles of grammaticality governing correct
linguistic expression and communication.
For a recent view that combines understanding of meaning and intuition
for knowledge of modality, see Boghossian Ch. 13 in Boghossian and
Williamson 2020.
Critical Questions for Intuition- and Understanding-Based
Accounts
The Causal Connection Question: One might wonder how intuition
might justify beliefs about modal facts and properties that we are not
causally or spatio-temporally connected to. How can intuition yield
knowledge of modality if there is no causal connection between possible
worlds and minds? If there is no causal connection between the mind and
the modal fact, what kind of epistemic connection could an intuition
provide us with? (For discussion see Bealer 2002).
The Justification for Implicit Knowledge Question: Sonia Roca-Royes
(2010) draws attention to the following problem in Peacocke’s
epistemology of modality. On Peacocke’s account, it appears that our
knowledge or understanding of modality is parasitic on our knowledge of
the Principles of Possibility, which are the principles anyone who
possesses the concept of possibility tacitly knows. But how do we know
such principles in the first place, or, equivalently, how does one manage to
possess the right possibility-concept? We determine that something is
possible or necessary for an entity in part through our tacit knowledge of
them, which includes knowledge of what is constitutive of the entity,
namely what it is to be the kind of thing in question. As a consequence of
the relation between the role of constitutive principles and our evaluation
of specific modal claims for the purposes of generating modal knowledge,
a comprehensive account of modal knowledge is incomplete without a
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picture of how we come to know the relevant constitutive principles
involved in our evaluations of modal knowledge. Peacocke has taken up
this challenge in recent work (2020). More recently, Roca-Royes (2019)
has generalized similar concerns to any account of modal knowledge that
rests on concept possession and understanding.
The Implicit to Explicit Knowledge Question: We said that for
Peacocke our knowledge or understanding of modality is parasitic on our
knowledge of the Principles of Possibility. However, it seems somewhat
unclear how our tacit knowledge of Principles of Possibility exactly gives
us explicit knowledge of modal facts. In other words, it seems that
Peacocke owes us an answer to the following question: How exactly are
we to epistemically move from (implicit) knowledge of Principles of
Possibility to (explicit) knowledge of modal facts or propositions so that
knowledge is transmitted? In answer to this question Peacocke offers the
following:
However, this leaves open what it means exactly to appropriately employ
the Principles of Possibility. Finally, thinking of the debate between
internalism and externalism in epistemology, it is relevant to ask whether
If it is granted that implicit knowledge of the Principles of
Possibility is appropriately employed in reaching modal
judgement, we can see how the judgement so reached is
knowledge. Provided that any non-modal principles upon which
she relies are known, a thinker’s modal judgements reached by the
proper use of the implicit knowledge of the Principles of
Possibility will, in the nature of the case, be knowledge. This is not
only a matter of reliability. The judgement of the modal truth is
explained by the thinker’s implicit grasp of principles which make
the modal truth hold. (1999: 162)
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our implicit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility guides our
judgment in a way such that this is accessible to the subject.
5. Varieties of Essentialism
Essentialism has recently become a major area of investigation in the
epistemology of modality. Essentialist accounts of modal knowledge draw
on results from recent metaphysical debates about essence. Generally,
metaphysical essentialism is the thesis that, in addition to mere accidental
properties, entities also have essential properties. Traditionally, essential
properties have been analyzed as those that necessarily belong to the
objects that they pertain to. In his influential (1994) article, however, Kit
Fine has argued against this analysis or reduction of essence to necessity.
Fine provides counterexamples to the traditional view by pointing out that
there are properties that an entity  has necessarily, though it is plausible
that they do not belong to the essence of x.  The notion of essence that
Fine is working with is a broadly Aristotelian notion, according to which
the essence of an entity  is the real definition of . Real definitions are
contrasted against nominal definitions. Nominal definitions define words
that stand for entities in the world, while real definitions define entities
themselves by telling us what is essential to them. (Note that the
explanation of essence in terms of real definition is not intended to be a
reductive one.) For example, the nominal definition of “water” is, say, the
drinkable liquid that is found in rivers and lakes on Earth, while the real
definition of water is H2O. (Note that, besides Aristotle, this definitional
notion of essence is already present in Locke and Husserl.)
Most essentialist accounts in the epistemology of modality rely on this
Finean (or Neo-Aristotelian) notion of definitional essence. The rejection
of the traditional account of essence, according to which essence reduces
to necessity, paved the way for what can be called Finean Essentialism
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(FE) Metaphysically necessities are true in virtue of (or: are grounded in)
essentialist truths.
Since our focus here is on essentialism as it is employed in the
epistemology of modality, we refer readers interested in metaphysical
issues concerning (FE) elsewhere. (For discussion in favor of (FE), see
Lowe 2008, 2012; Hale 2002, 2013, 2018; Kment 2014, 2021; Rosen
2015; Jago 2021; Tahko 2017, 2018; Wallner 2020; Wallner & Vaidya
2020; and Wilsch 2017. For criticism, see Della Rocca 1996a,b; Gorman
2005; Zalta 2006; Correia 2007; Cowling 2013; Wildman 2013; and
Livingstone-Banks 2017; as well as Leech 2018; Mackie forthcoming;
Noonan 2018; Romero 2019; Van Cleve 2018; and Wildman 2021.)
The core idea of essentialist accounts in the epistemology of modality is
that we acquire modal knowledge on the basis of knowledge of essence.
But note that (FE), i.e., the fact that essences metaphysically ground
modality, by no means entails that knowledge of modality must proceed
via knowledge of essence. Otherwise put, metaphysical priority doesn’t
require epistemic priority. Nonetheless, on the basis of (FE) essentialists
identify knowledge of essence as one chief pathway to modal knowledge.
One of the reasons for the growth of interest in essentialism in the
epistemology of modality stems from the criticism or incompleteness of
other accounts based on understanding, conceivability, or counterfactual
reasoning. An understanding-based theory such as Peacocke’s, for
example, naturally integrates an essentialist component by identifying the
constitutive principles for modal knowledge with essentialist principles.
Likewise, theories of conceivability such as Chalmers’ and Yablo’s, as
well as Williamson’s counterfactual theory, have been criticized for failing
to take adequate account of the role of essences in the acquisition of modal
knowledge (e.g., Roca-Royes 2011a,b; Tahko 2012; Vaidya & Wallner
2021).
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The essentialist claim that our modal knowledge depends on our
essentialist knowledge raises two main questions:
a. How do we gain knowledge of essences in the first place?
b. How do we transition from essentialist knowledge to modal
knowledge?
Following Fine, E.J. Lowe (2008, 2012) characterizes the essence of  as
the real definition of . Lowe’s answer to (a) is thus straightforward: we
know the essence of  simply by understanding what x is. Unfortunately,
Lowe does not elaborate on his notion of understanding (see Tahko 2017,
2018 for discussion). Instead, he puts forward a transcendental argument
for the claim that we have knowledge of essence. According to this,
Crucially, “knowing what things are” is meant to capture knowledge of
properties without which the object in question would not be the thing it
is. That is to say, Lowe does not talk about mere contingent classifications
(such as, say, being a gift or being located at the doorstep) but essential
properties that figure in the real definition of a thing.
Bob Hale’s (2013, 2021) answer to (a) is twofold. He distinguishes
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge of essence. In the case of a
priori knowledge of essence, essentialist knowledge is based on
knowledge of meaning. Hale acknowledges the difference between real
and nominal definitions. He then argues that sometimes both a nominal
and a real definition of an entity  can be given by using the same words.




Knowing an entity’s essence is simply knowing what that entity is.
And at least in the case of some entities, we must be able to know
what they are, because otherwise it would be hard to see how we
could know anything at all about them. (Lowe 2012: 944; see
Sgaravatti 2016 for criticism)
x
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“rectangle”, namely knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the application of the word, suffices for knowing a priori the real
definition or essence of being a rectangle (i.e., a four-sided closed figure
consisting of four right angles).
Additionally, Hale maintains that even where there is no explicit nominal
definition for a word, like for example in the case of basic logical
constants, such as “and”,
So, for Hale we can gain knoweldge of essence a priori via both implicit
and explit knowledge of meaning.
On the other hand, with regard to a posteriori knowledge of essence, Hale
relies on a Kripke-style deduction model.
If some  is , then it is essential to  that it is .
 is .
Thus, it is essential to  that it is .
Of course, (H1) is not going to be true for all instances of  and F.
However, Hale thinks that one can come to know in an a priori manner
claims such as if x is human, then it is essential to x that it is human.
Similarly, we know that it is not true that if  is a musician, then it is
essential to  that she is a musician. According to Hale, this is done by
distinguishing between pure and impure sortals (2013: 270–275). So, for
Hale, the major premise in (H1) is known a priori. The minor premise in
(H2) might be a piece of a posteriori knowledge, such as, e.g., that Joanie
is a human. When (H2) is a posteriori, the conclusion (H3) is also a
posteriori, since the combination of an a priori premise and an a
posteriori premise always yields an a posteriori conclusion.
knowing what [the word] “and” means is sufficient for knowledge
of the essence of truth-functional conjunction. (Hale 2013: 258)
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In sum, Hale holds that knowledge of essences can be gained from
knowledge of meaning as well as from knowledge that is established via
empirical investigation. By contrast, for Lowe the source of knowledge of
essence is understanding, which is different from both knowledge of
meaning and empirical investigation. (Still, Lowe doesn’t mean to rule out
that a posteriori knowledge may contribute to our knowledge of essence,
especially concerning kinds. See Tahko (2017, 2018) for discussion of
Lowe’s view concerning empirical knowledge of essence.) Although Hale
and Lowe's views on how we may gain knowledge of essences differ, they
agree on how knowledge of essences can give us in turn modal
knowledge, namely by deductive inference. The argument is as follows:
If it is essential to  that it is , then it is necessary that  is F.
It is essential to  that it is .
Thus, it is necessary that  is .
As we saw, inferring (H3) from (H1) and (H2) yields knowledge of
essence. Then, inferring (E3) from (E1) and (E2) is to use knowledge of
essence to gain knowledge of necessity.
Boris Kment (2021) puts forward an account of modal knowledge based
on his own modal metaphysics (2014). On Kment’s metaphysical
framework, modal facts are partially grounded in what he calls
metaphysical laws, which also comprise essentialist truths. Thereby, much
of our modal knowledge for Kment depends on knowledge of the
metaphysical laws, including essentialist truths. Kment discusses two
ways in which we may acquire knowledge of such laws (i.e., two ways to
answer question (b) above). First, abductively, via inference to the best
explanation (IBE). Second, we may come to know the metaphysical laws
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As to the first method, Kment holds that metaphysical laws (including
essentialist principles) play a crucial role in both metaphysical and causal
explanation. Accounting for what grounds or causes some non-
fundamental fact crucially involves making assumptions about
metaphysical laws. As for IBE, Kment holds that
For example, according to our best explanation, the fact that my cup of
coffee is hotter than your glass of iced tea is grounded in the fact that the
mean molecular kinetic energy of the former is higher than that of the
latter. Within Kment’s framework, this account entails that there is a
certain metaphysical covering law that is instantiated in this particular
instance of grounding. In this case, the law in question is the real
definition or essence of being-hotter-than: one object is hotter than another
iff the mean molecular kinetic energy of the former exceeds that of the
latter. In effect, for Kment, the epistemology of metaphysical (essentialist)
laws is a byproduct of the abductive epistemology of grounding and
causation.
As for the method of conceptual competence, Kment remarks that
competence with a term often requires (at least implicit) knowledge of part
or all of the real definition of the thing picked out by the term. For Kment,
real definitions are a type of essentialist truths. To have competence in
using the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility, one must
know, at least tacitly, that metaphysical modality is connected to
metaphysical laws, including laws that govern what is essential. (For a
similar view, see Peacocke 1999, §4.3 above. The role of linguistic
competence in the acquisition of essentialist knowledge has also been
stressed by Hale 2013, 2021).
an abductive inference that establishes the account [of grounding
or causation] will support these assumptions about metaphysical
laws as well. (Kment 2021: S1969)
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Thus, Kment’s theory answers question (a) by appealing to IBE and
conceptual competence. But what is his answer to question (b), namely,
how are essentialist knowledge and modal knowledge connected? By
contrast with Lowe and Hale, who appeal to deductive inference from
knowledge of essence to knowledge of necessity, Kment holds that
essentialist knowledge contributes to our modal knowledge by restricting
methods such as conceiving and counterfactual reasoning, in other words,
by providing epistemic friction, in the terminology introduced above. His
account, thus, indicates a possible answer to (PMEF) (see §2).
Mark Jago (2021) also offers an essentialist account of modal knowledge.
According to Jago, we can explain our knowledge of metaphysical
modality by way of our (implicit or explicit) knowledge of essence. Like
others, Jago aims to refute long-standing skepticism against essences; to
do so, he lays out a metaphysical account according to which essences are
simply bundles of located properties:
Moreover, for Jago we can refer and single out these bundles
straightforwardly, in thought or language, by conceptualizing them under
kinds. According to Jago,
Essences are constitutive of material objects. Located properties
“bundle” together to form a material object; and each property in
the bundle is essential to the material object thereby constituted.
Each material object is numerically identical to a located bundle of
its essential properties. (Jago 2021: S1987; see also Barker & Jago
2017)
there is a tendency linking (i) reference to a material object, (ii) our
conceptualising that object under some kind , and (iii) our belief
that that object is essentially . (2021: S1992)
F
F
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Notwithstanding some exceptions to this tendency, Jago takes it to be
appropriately reliable and safe from nearby error. On Jago’s externalist
epistemology of essence, a belief constitutes knowledge if it has an
appropriate connection to reality. He takes reliability and safety to
constitute such an appropriate connection to reality. Hence, Jago
concludes that
Knowledge of essence is thus secured by a reliable connection with reality,
which is due in part to the way we think about objects and form beliefs
about them. Knowledge of essence, in turn, leads us to knowledge of
necessity and possibility via a conceptual connection between essence and
necessity. For Jago, “it is a conceptual truth that whatever is essentially 
is necessarily ”; (2021: S1994) thereby, possessing the concepts of
“essence” and “necessity”, together with the relevant essentialist
knowledge jointly results in knowledge of necessity.
An account pairing essentialism with modal empiricism comes out of
Antonella Mallozzi’s (2021a, 2021e) work. According to Mallozzi, we can
clarify what the normative constraints on good modal reasoning are by
appealing to essences. Specifically, she maintains that essences are special
core properties that have distinctive explanatory powers in accounting for
how things are—as she puts it, essences are superexplanatory. Mallozzi
focuses on examples involving kinds and illustrates how essences
typically cause and explain many properties and behaviors that
consistently co-occur in the instances of kinds. For example, the atomic
constitution of a chemical element, say silver, explains why all samples of
silver share a whole host of properties, such as density, electrical and
[w]hen one has a referent  in mind and conceptualises it under
some kind , and thereby believes it to be essentially , that belief
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thermal conductivity, disposition to combine chemically, and so on.
Atomic number is, thus, the essence or “nature” of silver, for Mallozzi,
because of its powerful role in explaining the properties shared by all
samples of silver. Accordingly, given (FE), silver necessarily has that
atomic constitution. Against long-standing skepticism against essences,
Mallozzi emphasizes that such superexplanatory one-to-many causal
structures helps clarify in what sense essences are held to constitute the
“nature” of things, as well as how we can know about them. (Godman,
Mallozzi, & Papineau 2020 further investigate the metaphysics of kinds in
terms of superexplanatory properties, particularly for biological kinds.)
Mallozzi gives a moderate empiricist answer to question (a) above. In
most cases we acquire knowledge of essence empirically, largely via
scientific investigation aimed at discovering the relevant causal and
explanatory information. As to question (b), Mallozzi holds that once we
have knowledge of essence, we may then proceed to gain knowledge of
metaphysical necessity inferentially, via a fundamental Kripkean bridge-
principle (“If  is essentially , then necessarily  is ”).
Vaidya (2010) has proposed an account of our knowledge of essence that
is influenced by Husserl’s (1973) method of eidetic variation, according to
which we get access to the essence of an object by varying its features in
imagination. If a feature is seen to be invariant, then it is an essence. In
contrast to other essentialists discussed here, Vaidya explicitly targets
understanding and not knowledge of essence. (Following Kvanvig 2009,
Vaidya takes understanding [but not knowledge] to be compatible with
epistemic luck.) Taking Husserl’s ideas only as a point of departure,
Vaidya holds that we can gain understanding of the essence of some object
 by varying properties of  in our imagination. Of those properties that
are invariant over the multiplicity of variations, we judge that they are
essential to . (See Wallner forthcoming for a discussion of Husserl’s
epistemology of essence in contrast to that of Lowe and Hale, and Michels
(2020) for a critical discussion of Vaidya.)
X F X F
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Critical Questions for Essentialism
The Existence Question: Some are skeptical that there is a real
distinction between accidental and essential properties. Quine (1953
[1961], 1960) argued that whether or not a property is essential to an
object depends on how we refer to it. More recently, Sidelle (1989) has
provided an anti-realist view of essences. Mackie (2006) and Ásta (2008,
2010, 2013) have offered a critique of realist approaches to essences.
Further criticism of essences comes from recent philosophy of science.
Particularly, several philosophers of biology have criticized biological
essentialism (e.g., Ereshefsky 2010; Leslie 2013; Okasha 2002; for
discussion: Devitt 2021; Dumsday 2012).
The Metaphysics of Essence Question: If knowledge of modality
depends on (or crucially involves) knowledge of essence, then what
essences are metaphysically influences any story about how we know
about essence and, hence, modality. Hence, the following metaphysical
questions concerning essences are crucial for the epistemology of essence:
What are essences? Are they the sum of the essential properties of a given
entity, or kind? Are essences distinct entities from those things that they
are essences of? Is (knowledge of) essence linked to (knowledge of) de
dicto or de re necessity (or both)? Are there individual essences which
uniquely identify a certain entity or only general essences that pertain to
kinds of entities? Do all entities have exactly the same kind of essence?
For example, do social kinds have the same kind of essence that natural
kinds, or mathematical kinds have?
Nonetheless, on the basis of (FE) essentialists identify knowledge of
essence as one chief pathway to modal knowledge.
The Transition Question: A central question for essentialism concerns
the transition between knowledge of essence and knowledge of modality
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(see question (b) above). For deduction theories that deploy the inference
from (E1) and (E2) to (E3), one should ask: how is the bridge-principle
connecting essence to modality, (E1), known? Horvath (2014) argues that
it isn’t clear how we come to know the bridge principle (E1). As Horvath
remarks, a (purportedly non-modal) real definition or essence-statement
(like “gold is essentially the element with the atomic number 79”) doesn’t
make any explicit claim about metaphysical possibility or necessity.
Because of that, definitional essences do not seem generally capable of
explaining or grounding metaphysical modality. As Mackie (forthcoming)
puts it:
Recently, however, Wallner and Vaidya (2020) have proposed a non-
reductive interpretation of Finean Essentialism, according to which (E1)
follows from the essence of essences in virtue of the fact that essences
have modal bearing. Essences via their modal bearing constrain what is
objectively necessary and possible for a given entity. Hence, their view
might provide an answer to this question.
The Language to Essence Question: Some essentialist accounts hold that
knowledge of meaning or conceptual competence importantly contributes
to knowledge of essence (e.g., Hale’s and Kment’s). This raises a more
specific transition question concerning how we get to knowledge of
essence via linguistic or conceptual competence. It might be argued that
we acquire knowledge of essence by reflecting on our conceptual-
linguistic practices. However, how could our conceptual or linguistic
practices tell us what are the essential natures of mind-independent things?
Most theorists appeal to implicit knowledge of essence. But what does this
mean, exactly? Particularly, how do we find out what we know implicitly?
It looks as if the account of essence in terms of real definition is
intended to deliver a modal rabbit out of a non-modal hat. And I
don’t see how this can be done.
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The Completeness Question: According to Hale’s epistemology of
essence, we can come to know essentialist facts by deducing them from
essentialist principles (like in the inference from (H1) and (H2) to (H3)).
However, one might ask whether knowledge of the essentialist principle in
(H1) is not itself already essentialist knowledge. In other words, it might
be questioned whether such an account of essentialist knowledge can be
complete (for discussion: Wallner forthcoming). Wallner (forthcoming)
also points out that in order for us to successfully employ Hale’s
distinction between pure and impure sortals that is supposed to
differentiate essential from inessential properties, we might have to
presuppose essentialist knowledge.
6. Perception
Traditionally, modal epistemologists have assumed that we cannot gain
knowledge of modality by investigating what is actually the case (see, e.g.,
Craig 1985; Peacocke 1999). In particular, it seems that our perceptual
capacities on their own cannot yield knowledge of what is possible and
necessary. Perception, so the story goes, shows us at best how things are,
not how they could have been or must be. If necessity is truth in all
possible worlds, and perception only provides us with evidence for how
the actual world is, how can we perceive necessity? Similarly, if non-
actualized possibilities have no truth-maker in the actual world, since they
are non-actualized, how can we perceive possibility? One might infer from
how things are that they might be a certain way, but how can one perceive
how things merely could be? In light of these considerations, perception
has been thought to be categorically inappropriate for gaining modal
knowledge. Recently, modal epistemologists have challenged the
traditional stance. In particular, some have switched the focus of the
epistemology of modality from far out claims about the possibility of
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zombie worlds to every-day modal claims, such as whether the couch
could make it up the stairs, or that Joel can climb the boulder.
Margot Strohminger (2015) uses practical examples of modal knowledge
to challenge the idea that we cannot perceive possibility. For example, at
least in some instances we seem to be able to see that we can climb a tree
(even if we have not yet climbed it), or that we can reach a certain mug
(even though we have not yet tried). In Strohminger’s view, one literally
perceives the possibility, rather than seeing something first and then
making a (possibly tacit) inference on the basis of what one sees.
Importantly, a defense of the pure perception of possibility requires a view
of perception where something more than low level properties, such as
color and shape, are present in perception. One class of views on which
perception provides more than just low-level properties are affordance
theories, due to Gibson (1979). On an affordance view, one may hold that
possibility is part of what we perceive. For example, Iris sees that the door
knob can be turned.
Barbara Vetter has recently expanded her work on the metaphysics of
potentiality (2015) and developed a perceptual account of modal
knowledge based on every-day cases and affordance views of perception
(see Gibson 1966; see also Nanay 2011, 2013). According to Vetter
(2021), we literally see potentialities or possibilities as part of the content
of our perception. In her (forthcoming) she emphasizes that her account is
ambitious. In her view, all of our modal knowledge is based on knowledge
of our own abilities and dispositions, as well as the dispositions and
affordances of objects around us. Modal knowledge is, thus, for Vetter,
distinctively empirical, in that it requires experiencing such dispositions
and affordances.
While Strohminger and Vetter focus on knowledge of non-actual
possibilities, Catherine Legg and James Franklin (2017) hold that one can
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perceive necessities visually through certain kinds of diagrams, such as
picture proofs in mathematics. The diagrams themselves provide us with a
perceptual path to seeing that certain kinds of truths are necessary (see
also Legg 2012).
Critical Questions for Perceptual Theories
The Is-It-Really-Perception Question: Does sensory perceptual
experience on its own really give knowledge of what is possible or
necessary, or does the knowledge use rational intuition about the perceived
content as well? If we literally see that something is possible, what does its
possibility look like? What is a visual appearance of being possible?
The Modal Kind Question: What kind of modality does one perceive?
For example, when I see that I can reach a mug, what kind of modality is it
that I see? One view is that what I see is practical possibility. And if that is
so, this raises the Navigation question of how one is to epistemically
navigate from practical possibility to metaphysical possibility. Do we
navigate from practical to metaphysical possibility by (tacit) inference via
the background assumption that whatever is practically possible is also
metaphysically possible? Or does this background assumption inform our
perceptual practices to the effect that we indeed directly perceive
metaphysical possibility?
7. Induction and Abduction
Sonia Roca-Royes and Bob Fischer both take a modest approach to the
epistemology of modality. Roca-Royes (2017, 2018) divides the space of
epistemological investigation via the ontological distinction between
concrete and abstract entities. In a 2017 work she offers a similarity-based
account of our knowledge of de re modality for concrete entities. And in
her (2018) she offers an account of modal knowledge for abstract entities.
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Fischer (2017) divides the space of epistemological investigation via a
topical distinction between ordinary and extraordinary claims.
Roca-Royes aims to answer the question: how can we come to know what
is possible for a particular entity? A starting point for her account is the
following example:
Her account can be unfolded as follows:
 knows (via perception, say) that Twin-Messy actually broke.
 knows that what is actual is possible.
So,  can warrantedly transition to: It is possible that Twin-
Messy breaks.
 knows that “objects similarly made out of the same sort of
materials are susceptible to similar effect” (2017: 227).
 knows that Messy is similarly made out of the same sort of
materials as Twin-Messy was made.
So,  can warrantedly transition to: It is possible that Messy
breaks.
Crucial to Roca-Royes’s account is the notion of an epistemic counterpart,
whereby  is an epistemic counterpart of  just in case there’s a point in
each of ’s and ’s timelines where they are relevantly similar (e.g., made
from the same kind of materials) and, in virtue of this, what has happened
to a informs us of what could happen to . In the example: Twin-Messy’s
breaking informs us that Messy can break. Premise (RR4) plays a major
I know that the wooden table in my office, Messy, is not broken.
How do I know that? I see it. Although not broken, Messy can
break. How do I know that? Because the table I had before Messy,
which we may call “Twin-Messy”, was a twin-sister of Messy, and
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role in Roca-Royes’ account. She calls the knowledge at stake here nomic-
like (2017: 229) and clarifies that it is supported inductively, since it
heavily relies on the uniformity of nature.
Fischer (2017) proposes a Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality, TEM,
for extraordinary or philosophical modal claims. The basic idea is that we
are justified in believing an extraordinary modal claim, , only if we are
justified in believing a theory  from which  follows. For example, we
are justified in believing that mind-body dualism is metaphysically
possible only if we are justified in believing a theory  from which mind-
body dualism follows. Importantly, Fischer holds that abductive methods
for theory choice, such as using theoretical virtues like simplicity, are
central to being justified in believing a theory. If the theory  from which
one would be justified in believing that mind-body dualism is
metaphysically possible is not the simplest theory, all else being equal,
then one would not be justified in believing it, and thus not be justified in
believing that mind-body dualism is metaphysically possible.
For other discussions involving abduction see Hanrahan (2017), who
discusses it in the case of imagination, Biggs (2011), who discusses it in
the context of conceivability, and Biggs and Wilson (2021), who discuss it
in relation to Carnap and anti-realism. Importantly, for Wilson and Biggs
abduction is an a priori enterprise.
Critical Questions for Induction and Abduction
The Relevant Similarity Question: Generalizing (RR4) above, Roca-
Royes speaks of relevant similarity of an object with its counterpart. But
what are the relevant respects of similarity, and how do we know that?
This seems to be the most crucial question in Roca-Royes’ account. Roca-
Royes addresses the issue of relevant and irrelevant similarity for the
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Messy). However, Roca-Royes concedes that the details for the
generalizability of these considerations about relevant similarity are still to
be worked out in full detail. (For further critical discussion of Roca-Royes’
account see Prelević 2015)
The Priority Question: Fischer’s TEM makes it seem that our
justification for extraordinary modal claims always comes by way of
having a theory first. However, one might wonder if sometimes we have
justification for extraordinary modal claims prior to building theories that
would justify them. Consider the following:
1. For Berkeley, it is inconceivable for a tree to exist unperceived by
anyone.
2. If  is inconceivable for , then  has justification for believing that p
is impossible.
3. So, Berkeley has justification for believing that it is impossible for a
tree to exist, or anything for that matter, unperceived by anyone.
4. Idealism is the view that existence depends on perception. Esse est
percipe.
5. So, Berkeley has justification for idealism.
However, Fischer's TEM appears to hold that Berkeley must first believe
with justification Idealism, for him to believe that a tree cannot exist
unperceived by anyone. This result appears to contradict how we
sometimes use conceivability to gain justification in order to believe a
theory. (For further critical discussion of Fischer’s account, see Biggs
2017 and Wirling 2020).
8. Modalism and Normativism
Some authors have recently tried to solve the Integration and the
Reliability Challenge by rejecting well-established views in modal
p S S
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metaphysics.
Otávio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski (2015) adopt modalism about
modality. They maintain that there is no reductive analysis of modality in
terms of non-modal facts or properties. For arguably one cannot reduce the
truth of “It is possible that ” to “It is true in some world, , that ”
without wondering whether or not  itself is possible or impossible. The
epistemological task for Bueno and Shalkowski is thus to provide an
account of how we come to know modal truths while accepting a
primitivist view of modality. In this way, Bueno and Shalkowski aim to
meet the Integration Challenge.
Bueno and Shalkowski describe their account of our knowledge of non-
actual possibilities as follows:
The core idea is that in many cases we arrive at modal knowledge by
investigating the relevant properties and objects in question rather than
turning to some special epistemic capacity, such as being conceivable. For
example, one can know that it is possible for an unbroken table to break
because it is breakable. How do we come to know this piece of ordinary
modal knowledge? We do so on the basis of our knowledge of wood,
P w P
w
On our account, what grounds modal knowledge is ultimately our
knowledge of the relevant modal properties of the objects under
consideration. … Suppose we are trying to determine whether we
know that the table Hemingway used to write on in his Key West
house would have broken had a 26,000-pound giant African bull
elephant sat on it. …On our account, we know that it would have
broken simply by knowing the properties that such an elephant has
and the properties the table has, modal in character as they already
are. (2015: 680).
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chemical bonds, and the physical relations the table can find itself in, such
as having a giant bull elephant sit on it.
Amie Thomasson (2021) contends that we should reject a widespread
descriptivist picture of modality. According to descriptivism, the primary
function of modal discourse is to track and describe modal facts and
properties, which supposedly exist independently of our expressive
capacities and make true our modal statements. Instead, according to
Thomasson’s Modal Normativism (MN), modal discourse is distinctively
normative, in that it
Possibility and necessity are thus to be explained by reference to semantic
rules, not to some mind-independent modal reality. For example,
according to Thomasson, the fact that necessarily, all bachelors are
unmarried shouldn’t be explained in terms of some modal fact involving
male humans that are bachelors; but rather in terms of the rules for correct
application of the terms ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’; particularly, the rule
that “One may only apply ‘bachelor’ where ‘unmarried’ may be applied”.
Once (MN) is in place, for Thomasson we can then explain modal
knowledge in a straightforward way. Speakers who can use the semantic
rules correctly show implicit modal knowledge. Whereas, speakers have
explicit modal knowledge when they develop the ability to explicitly
convey in the object language and indicative mood the semantic rules: in
our example, when they are able to express: “Necessarily, all bachelors are
unmarried”. Importantly, for Thomasson, we can still talk about modal
truth. From the sentence “Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried” we can
infer “‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ is true” by applying the
serves the function of expressing, teaching, conveying, or (re-)
negotiating semantic rules (or their consequences) in particularly
advantageous ways. (2021: S2087)
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(deflationist) equivalence schema “  is true iff ” (see Thomasson
2021).
Critical Questions for Modalism and Normativism
The Completeness Question: On Bueno and Shalkowski’s view we
arrive at knowledge of modal propositions through knowledge of modal
properties. But how do we gain knowledge of modal properties in the first
place? For Bueno and Shalkowski properties are understood in a
deflationary way, that is, they are not characterized in terms of universals
or abstract entities. They are simply traits of objects. We know that the
vase is fragile because it is made out of glass and glass can be broken if
struck. But knowledge of the fact that glass can be broken is itself modal
knowledge. Hence, some knowledge of modal properties is yet to be
accounted for.
The Scope Question and its Consequences: One might question whether
Thomasson’s Modal Normativism succeeds in explaining knowledge of
metaphysical modality, particularly as opposed to conceptual modality or
epistemic analyticity. Arguably, mastering the semantic rules determining
the actual application conditions of, say, “water”, and possessing the
relevant empirical information, won’t suffice to settle whether it is
metaphysically possible for water to be XYZ or contain carbon. As a
consequence, because of its sole focus on semantic rules, Modal
Normativism might imply that classical metaphysical debates in
philosophy are merely a matter of verbal disagreement and negotiation.
While it is not clear whether this constitutes a problem, in the eyes of the
modal normativist, it does raise an important point of disagreement. For
example, are participants in the debate on the mind-body problem really
discussing the nature of consciousness in relation to the physical body or
are they just renegotiating our rules for “mind”, “body”, and “conscious”
etc.? For some the mind-body problem is not about the words “mind” and
⟨p⟩ p
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“body” but about minds and bodies (for discussion, see Mallozzi
forthcoming b).
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